Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias

People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things,...

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Main Authors: Latham, A, Miller, K, Tarsney, C, Tierney, H
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Springer 2022
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author Latham, A
Miller, K
Tarsney, C
Tierney, H
author_facet Latham, A
Miller, K
Tarsney, C
Tierney, H
author_sort Latham, A
collection OXFORD
description People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we might conclude that they are irrational. This paper investigates one hypothesis, according to which future-bias is (at least partially) explained by our having a phenomenology that we describe, or conceive of, as being as of time robustly passing. We empirically tested this hypothesis and found no evidence in its favour. Our results present a puzzle, however, when compared with the results of an earlier study. We conclude that although robust passage phenomenology on its own probably does not explain future-bias, having this phenomenology and taking it to be veridical may contribute to future-bias.
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spelling oxford-uuid:4f5ffdba-72e9-4862-ab5a-91e745f2e2c62022-03-26T16:06:44ZRobust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-biasJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:4f5ffdba-72e9-4862-ab5a-91e745f2e2c6EnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer2022Latham, AMiller, KTarsney, CTierney, HPeople are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we might conclude that they are irrational. This paper investigates one hypothesis, according to which future-bias is (at least partially) explained by our having a phenomenology that we describe, or conceive of, as being as of time robustly passing. We empirically tested this hypothesis and found no evidence in its favour. Our results present a puzzle, however, when compared with the results of an earlier study. We conclude that although robust passage phenomenology on its own probably does not explain future-bias, having this phenomenology and taking it to be veridical may contribute to future-bias.
spellingShingle Latham, A
Miller, K
Tarsney, C
Tierney, H
Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias
title Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias
title_full Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias
title_fullStr Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias
title_full_unstemmed Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias
title_short Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias
title_sort robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future bias
work_keys_str_mv AT lathama robustpassagephenomenologyprobablydoesnotexplainfuturebias
AT millerk robustpassagephenomenologyprobablydoesnotexplainfuturebias
AT tarsneyc robustpassagephenomenologyprobablydoesnotexplainfuturebias
AT tierneyh robustpassagephenomenologyprobablydoesnotexplainfuturebias