Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias
People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things,...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | Latham, A, Miller, K, Tarsney, C, Tierney, H |
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Μορφή: | Journal article |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Springer
2022
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Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
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