Tennant on knowable truth
The paper responds to Neil Tennant's recent discussion of Fitch's so-called paradox of knowability in the context of intuitionistic logic. Tennant's criticisms of the author's earlier work on this topic are shown to rest on a principle about the assertability of disjunctions with...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
2000
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| _version_ | 1797067982589919232 |
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| author | Williamson, T |
| author_facet | Williamson, T |
| author_sort | Williamson, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The paper responds to Neil Tennant's recent discussion of Fitch's so-called paradox of knowability in the context of intuitionistic logic. Tennant's criticisms of the author's earlier work on this topic are shown to rest on a principle about the assertability of disjunctions with the absurd consequence that everything we could make true already is true. Tennant restricts the anti-realist principle that truth implies knowability in order to escape Fitch's argument, but a more complex variant of the argument is shown to elicit from his restricted principle exactly the consequences which it was intended to avoid. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:04:08Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:4f95ec88-a710-412a-a843-40ed55dd1126 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:04:08Z |
| publishDate | 2000 |
| publisher | Blackwell Publishers Ltd. |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:4f95ec88-a710-412a-a843-40ed55dd11262022-03-26T16:08:03ZTennant on knowable truthJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:4f95ec88-a710-412a-a843-40ed55dd1126PhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetBlackwell Publishers Ltd.2000Williamson, TThe paper responds to Neil Tennant's recent discussion of Fitch's so-called paradox of knowability in the context of intuitionistic logic. Tennant's criticisms of the author's earlier work on this topic are shown to rest on a principle about the assertability of disjunctions with the absurd consequence that everything we could make true already is true. Tennant restricts the anti-realist principle that truth implies knowability in order to escape Fitch's argument, but a more complex variant of the argument is shown to elicit from his restricted principle exactly the consequences which it was intended to avoid. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Williamson, T Tennant on knowable truth |
| title | Tennant on knowable truth |
| title_full | Tennant on knowable truth |
| title_fullStr | Tennant on knowable truth |
| title_full_unstemmed | Tennant on knowable truth |
| title_short | Tennant on knowable truth |
| title_sort | tennant on knowable truth |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT williamsont tennantonknowabletruth |