Principal and Expert Agent.
This paper analyses principal-agent contracts when the agent's action generates information not directly verifiable but used by the agent to make a risky decision. It considers a more general formulation than those studied previously, focusing on the impact on the decision made and the contract...
מחבר ראשי: | Malcomson, J |
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פורמט: | Working paper |
שפה: | English |
יצא לאור: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2004
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פריטים דומים
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Principal and expert agent
מאת: Malcomson, J
יצא לאור: (2004) -
Principal and Expert Agent.
מאת: Malcomson, J
יצא לאור: (2009) -
Principal and Expert Agent
מאת: Malcomson, J
יצא לאור: (2009) -
The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem.
מאת: Malcomson, J, et al.
יצא לאור: (1988) -
Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents.
מאת: Malcomson, J
יצא לאור: (1986)