Principal and Expert Agent.
This paper analyses principal-agent contracts when the agent's action generates information not directly verifiable but used by the agent to make a risky decision. It considers a more general formulation than those studied previously, focusing on the impact on the decision made and the contract...
Hovedforfatter: | Malcomson, J |
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Format: | Working paper |
Sprog: | English |
Udgivet: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2004
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Lignende værker
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Principal and expert agent
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2004) -
Principal and Expert Agent.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2009) -
Principal and Expert Agent
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2009) -
The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem.
af: Malcomson, J, et al.
Udgivet: (1988) -
Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1986)