Principal and Expert Agent.
This paper analyses principal-agent contracts when the agent's action generates information not directly verifiable but used by the agent to make a risky decision. It considers a more general formulation than those studied previously, focusing on the impact on the decision made and the contract...
मुख्य लेखक: | Malcomson, J |
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स्वरूप: | Working paper |
भाषा: | English |
प्रकाशित: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2004
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समान संसाधन
समान संसाधन
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Principal and expert agent
द्वारा: Malcomson, J
प्रकाशित: (2004) -
Principal and Expert Agent.
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Principal and Expert Agent
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The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem.
द्वारा: Malcomson, J, और अन्य
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Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents.
द्वारा: Malcomson, J
प्रकाशित: (1986)