The power of public positions: official roles in Kantian legitimacy
The Kantian account of political authority holds that the state is a necessary and sufficient condition of our freedom. We cannot be free outside the state, Kantians argue, because any attempt to have the “acquired rights” necessary for our freedom implicates us in objectionable relations of depende...
| Главный автор: | |
|---|---|
| Другие авторы: | |
| Формат: | Book section |
| Язык: | English |
| Опубликовано: |
Oxford University Press
2018
|
| _version_ | 1826311104567967744 |
|---|---|
| author | Sinclair, T |
| author2 | Sobel, D |
| author_facet | Sobel, D Sinclair, T |
| author_sort | Sinclair, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The Kantian account of political authority holds that the state is a necessary and sufficient condition of our freedom. We cannot be free outside the state, Kantians argue, because any attempt to have the “acquired rights” necessary for our freedom implicates us in objectionable relations of dependence on private judgment. Only in the state can this problem be overcome. But it is not clear how mere institutions could make the necessary difference, and contemporary Kantians have not offered compelling explanations. A detailed analysis is presented of the problems Kantians identify with the state of nature and the objections they face in claiming that the state overcomes them. A response is sketched on behalf of Kantians. The key idea is that under state institutions, a person can make claims of acquired right without presupposing that she is by nature exceptional in her capacity to bind others. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:03:27Z |
| format | Book section |
| id | oxford-uuid:543f9515-c95c-42a2-8495-d9e9a8c84973 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:03:27Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:543f9515-c95c-42a2-8495-d9e9a8c849732023-10-12T13:41:54ZThe power of public positions: official roles in Kantian legitimacyBook sectionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843uuid:543f9515-c95c-42a2-8495-d9e9a8c84973EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2018Sinclair, TSobel, DThe Kantian account of political authority holds that the state is a necessary and sufficient condition of our freedom. We cannot be free outside the state, Kantians argue, because any attempt to have the “acquired rights” necessary for our freedom implicates us in objectionable relations of dependence on private judgment. Only in the state can this problem be overcome. But it is not clear how mere institutions could make the necessary difference, and contemporary Kantians have not offered compelling explanations. A detailed analysis is presented of the problems Kantians identify with the state of nature and the objections they face in claiming that the state overcomes them. A response is sketched on behalf of Kantians. The key idea is that under state institutions, a person can make claims of acquired right without presupposing that she is by nature exceptional in her capacity to bind others. |
| spellingShingle | Sinclair, T The power of public positions: official roles in Kantian legitimacy |
| title | The power of public positions: official roles in Kantian legitimacy |
| title_full | The power of public positions: official roles in Kantian legitimacy |
| title_fullStr | The power of public positions: official roles in Kantian legitimacy |
| title_full_unstemmed | The power of public positions: official roles in Kantian legitimacy |
| title_short | The power of public positions: official roles in Kantian legitimacy |
| title_sort | power of public positions official roles in kantian legitimacy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT sinclairt thepowerofpublicpositionsofficialrolesinkantianlegitimacy AT sinclairt powerofpublicpositionsofficialrolesinkantianlegitimacy |