Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist.

Should a multiproduct monopolist whose "average price" is capped by regulation be allowed to engage in (third-degree) price discrimination? If the cap applies to a price index with weights proportional to demands at uniform prices, then price discrimination benefits consumers as well as th...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Armstrong, M, Vickers, J
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Blackwell Publishing 1991
_version_ 1826272838100713472
author Armstrong, M
Vickers, J
author_facet Armstrong, M
Vickers, J
author_sort Armstrong, M
collection OXFORD
description Should a multiproduct monopolist whose "average price" is capped by regulation be allowed to engage in (third-degree) price discrimination? If the cap applies to a price index with weights proportional to demands at uniform prices, then price discrimination benefits consumers as well as the firm. But if--perhaps more realistically--it is the firm's average revenue that is capped, then consumers prefer uniform pricing. In this case total output is higher when discrimination is allowed, which increases welfare, but marginal utilities differ across markets, which is inefficient, and the overall effect is ambiguous. A small amount of discrimination is desirable, however. It is better not to allow price discrimination if the price cap is close to the level of marginal cost. The consequences of tightening the price cap when discrimination is allowed are also examined.
first_indexed 2024-03-06T22:18:54Z
format Journal article
id oxford-uuid:545be262-dff2-442b-89c2-0781eae31347
institution University of Oxford
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-06T22:18:54Z
publishDate 1991
publisher Blackwell Publishing
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:545be262-dff2-442b-89c2-0781eae313472022-03-26T16:37:17ZWelfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:545be262-dff2-442b-89c2-0781eae31347EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsBlackwell Publishing1991Armstrong, MVickers, JShould a multiproduct monopolist whose "average price" is capped by regulation be allowed to engage in (third-degree) price discrimination? If the cap applies to a price index with weights proportional to demands at uniform prices, then price discrimination benefits consumers as well as the firm. But if--perhaps more realistically--it is the firm's average revenue that is capped, then consumers prefer uniform pricing. In this case total output is higher when discrimination is allowed, which increases welfare, but marginal utilities differ across markets, which is inefficient, and the overall effect is ambiguous. A small amount of discrimination is desirable, however. It is better not to allow price discrimination if the price cap is close to the level of marginal cost. The consequences of tightening the price cap when discrimination is allowed are also examined.
spellingShingle Armstrong, M
Vickers, J
Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist.
title Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist.
title_full Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist.
title_fullStr Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist.
title_full_unstemmed Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist.
title_short Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist.
title_sort welfare effects of price discrimination by a regulated monopolist
work_keys_str_mv AT armstrongm welfareeffectsofpricediscriminationbyaregulatedmonopolist
AT vickersj welfareeffectsofpricediscriminationbyaregulatedmonopolist