Fiscal inertia, donor credibility, and the monetary management of aid surges
Donors cannot pre-commit to support scaled-up public spending programs on a continuing basis, nor can governments credibly commit to curtail expenditure rapidly in the event that aid revenues contract. An aid boom may therefore be accompanied by a credibility problem. When this is the case, the <...
मुख्य लेखकों: | Buffie, E, O'Connell, S, Adam, C |
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स्वरूप: | Journal article |
प्रकाशित: |
Elsevier
2010
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समान संसाधन
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Fiscal inertia, donor credibility, and the monetary management of aid surges
द्वारा: Buffie, E, और अन्य
प्रकाशित: (2010) -
Fiscal inertia, donor credibility, and the monetary management of aid surges
द्वारा: Buffie, E, और अन्य
प्रकाशित: (2010) -
Monetary policy rules for managing aid surges in Africa
द्वारा: Adam, C, और अन्य
प्रकाशित: (2009) -
Monetary policy rules for managing aid surges in Africa
द्वारा: Adam, C, और अन्य
प्रकाशित: (2009) -
Monetary policy rules for managing aid surges in Africa
द्वारा: Adam, C, और अन्य
प्रकाशित: (2009)