Fiscal inertia, donor credibility, and the monetary management of aid surges
Donors cannot pre-commit to support scaled-up public spending programs on a continuing basis, nor can governments credibly commit to curtail expenditure rapidly in the event that aid revenues contract. An aid boom may therefore be accompanied by a credibility problem. When this is the case, the <...
| Những tác giả chính: | , , |
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| Định dạng: | Journal article |
| Được phát hành: |
Elsevier
2010
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Những quyển sách tương tự
Interactions between Monetary Policy and Fiscal Rules.
Bằng: Leith, C, et al.
Được phát hành: (1999)
Bằng: Leith, C, et al.
Được phát hành: (1999)