Bargaining with hard evidence
This article studies how the presence of concealable hard evidence affects the timing of agreement and the size and distribution of surplus in bargaining. A buyer and a seller receive randomly arriving, verifiable, but concealable evidence about the value of a tradable good. Each party discloses ind...
Main Authors: | Eso, E, Wallace, C |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2018
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