| Summary: | <p>The thesis is concerned with the law of private nuisance and the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, but not with public or statutory nuisance. It is submitted that every case of nuisance is determinable according to the same general principles. The thesis explores the "state of affairs" concept and who the appropriate defendant is. Knowledge of the state of affairs and foreseeability of harm by the defendant are seen as essential to the formation of liability; the suggestion that there are “intentional (or strict) protected nuisances" and "negligent nuisances" is rejected. The right by nuisance is the right to the ordinary enjoyment of land, and the person entitied to this right is the occupier. The nature of this right and the extent of the remedies available are discussed.</p>
<p>The case of Rylands v. Fletcher is seen as but another nuisance case. All the suggested differences between nuisance and Rylands v. Fletcher are explored and found to be illusory. Theories that Rylands v. Fletcher is an application of the "risk-duty" concept of negligence or of a tort of strict liability for “ultrahazardous activities" are examined but found wanting.</p>
<p>The vague concept of "reasonableness" often associated with nuisance is redefined in terms of a defence of ordinary use; the defendant must prove that the state of affairs was ordinary and that the activity causing harm was reasonably done.(This is the defence to Rylands v. Fletcher often "natural user".) Other defences are statutory authority, consent, and contributory negligence, all of which are analysed. Alleged defences found to be without justification in the light of the juristic basis of nuisance are act of a stranger, Act of God, coming to the nuisance, prescription, and the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774, s.86.</p>
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