Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science
Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that bel...
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| Format: | Journal article |
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Springer Netherlands
2017
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| _version_ | 1826273035464736768 |
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| author | Quilty-Dunn, J Mandelbaum, E |
| author_facet | Quilty-Dunn, J Mandelbaum, E |
| author_sort | Quilty-Dunn, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:22:02Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:555ffb0c-f87d-429d-9515-09165ba9e14c |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:22:02Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Springer Netherlands |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:555ffb0c-f87d-429d-9515-09165ba9e14c2022-03-26T16:43:37ZAgainst dispositionalism: belief in cognitive scienceJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:555ffb0c-f87d-429d-9515-09165ba9e14cSymplectic Elements at OxfordSpringer Netherlands2017Quilty-Dunn, JMandelbaum, EDispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change. |
| spellingShingle | Quilty-Dunn, J Mandelbaum, E Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science |
| title | Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science |
| title_full | Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science |
| title_fullStr | Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science |
| title_full_unstemmed | Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science |
| title_short | Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science |
| title_sort | against dispositionalism belief in cognitive science |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT quiltydunnj againstdispositionalismbeliefincognitivescience AT mandelbaume againstdispositionalismbeliefincognitivescience |