What do multiwinner voting rules do? An experiment over the two-dimensional Euclidean domain

What do multiwinner voting rules do? An experiment over the two-dimensional Euclidean domain

We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules — SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin–Courant, and PAV — for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfo...

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Dades bibliogràfiques
Autors principals:	Elkind, E, Faliszewski, P, Laslier, J-F, Skowron, P, Slinko, A, Talmon, N
Format:	Conference item
Idioma:	English
Publicat:	AAAI Press 2017

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