Horizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some Evidence From the USA.

This Paper provides a simple theoretical framework for analysing simultaneous vertical and horizontal competition in excise taxes, and estimates equations informed by the theory on a panel of US state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline. We also examine the role played by smuggling....

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Main Authors: Devereux, M, Lockwood, B, Redoano, M
Format: Working paper
Language:English
Published: CEPR 2004
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author Devereux, M
Lockwood, B
Redoano, M
author_facet Devereux, M
Lockwood, B
Redoano, M
author_sort Devereux, M
collection OXFORD
description This Paper provides a simple theoretical framework for analysing simultaneous vertical and horizontal competition in excise taxes, and estimates equations informed by the theory on a panel of US state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline. We also examine the role played by smuggling. The results are generally consistent with the theory, when the characteristics of the markets for the goods are taken into account. For neither good do federal excise taxes affect state taxes. Taxes in neighbouring states have a significant and large effect in the case of cigarettes, and a much weaker effect in the case of gasoline. We also find that in the setting of cigarette taxes, concerns about cross-border shopping play a more important role than concerns about smuggling.
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spelling oxford-uuid:55bd80af-fca2-4f48-9a8a-177b44a7c3712022-03-26T16:45:55ZHorizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some Evidence From the USA.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:55bd80af-fca2-4f48-9a8a-177b44a7c371EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsCEPR2004Devereux, MLockwood, BRedoano, MThis Paper provides a simple theoretical framework for analysing simultaneous vertical and horizontal competition in excise taxes, and estimates equations informed by the theory on a panel of US state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline. We also examine the role played by smuggling. The results are generally consistent with the theory, when the characteristics of the markets for the goods are taken into account. For neither good do federal excise taxes affect state taxes. Taxes in neighbouring states have a significant and large effect in the case of cigarettes, and a much weaker effect in the case of gasoline. We also find that in the setting of cigarette taxes, concerns about cross-border shopping play a more important role than concerns about smuggling.
spellingShingle Devereux, M
Lockwood, B
Redoano, M
Horizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some Evidence From the USA.
title Horizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some Evidence From the USA.
title_full Horizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some Evidence From the USA.
title_fullStr Horizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some Evidence From the USA.
title_full_unstemmed Horizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some Evidence From the USA.
title_short Horizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some Evidence From the USA.
title_sort horizontal and vertical indirect tax competition theory and some evidence from the usa
work_keys_str_mv AT devereuxm horizontalandverticalindirecttaxcompetitiontheoryandsomeevidencefromtheusa
AT lockwoodb horizontalandverticalindirecttaxcompetitiontheoryandsomeevidencefromtheusa
AT redoanom horizontalandverticalindirecttaxcompetitiontheoryandsomeevidencefromtheusa