Blame mitigation: a less tidy take and its philosophical implications
Why do we find agents less blameworthy when they face mitigating circumstances, and what does this show about philosophical theories of moral responsibility? We present novel evidence that the tendency to mitigate the blameworthiness of agents is driven both by the perception that they are less norm...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Taylor and Francis
2021
|
| _version_ | 1826309976739545088 |
|---|---|
| author | Daigle, JL Demaree-Cotton, J |
| author_facet | Daigle, JL Demaree-Cotton, J |
| author_sort | Daigle, JL |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Why do we find agents less blameworthy when they face mitigating circumstances, and what does this show about philosophical theories of moral responsibility? We present novel evidence that the tendency to mitigate the blameworthiness of agents is driven both by the perception that they are less normatively competent – in particular, less able to know that what they are doing is wrong – and by the perception that their behavior is less attributable to their deep selves. Consequently, we argue that philosophers cannot rely on the case strategy to support the Normative Competence theory of moral responsibility over the Deep Self theory. However, we also outline ways in which further empirical and philosophical work would shift the debate, by showing that there is a significant departure between ordinary concepts and corresponding philosophical concepts, or by focusing on a different type of coherence with ordinary judgments. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:43:47Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:55e8e2a1-c044-42ad-9148-8f68e51c3a53 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:43:47Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Taylor and Francis |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:55e8e2a1-c044-42ad-9148-8f68e51c3a532023-05-23T09:06:06ZBlame mitigation: a less tidy take and its philosophical implicationsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:55e8e2a1-c044-42ad-9148-8f68e51c3a53EnglishSymplectic ElementsTaylor and Francis2021Daigle, JLDemaree-Cotton, JWhy do we find agents less blameworthy when they face mitigating circumstances, and what does this show about philosophical theories of moral responsibility? We present novel evidence that the tendency to mitigate the blameworthiness of agents is driven both by the perception that they are less normatively competent – in particular, less able to know that what they are doing is wrong – and by the perception that their behavior is less attributable to their deep selves. Consequently, we argue that philosophers cannot rely on the case strategy to support the Normative Competence theory of moral responsibility over the Deep Self theory. However, we also outline ways in which further empirical and philosophical work would shift the debate, by showing that there is a significant departure between ordinary concepts and corresponding philosophical concepts, or by focusing on a different type of coherence with ordinary judgments. |
| spellingShingle | Daigle, JL Demaree-Cotton, J Blame mitigation: a less tidy take and its philosophical implications |
| title | Blame mitigation: a less tidy take and its philosophical implications |
| title_full | Blame mitigation: a less tidy take and its philosophical implications |
| title_fullStr | Blame mitigation: a less tidy take and its philosophical implications |
| title_full_unstemmed | Blame mitigation: a less tidy take and its philosophical implications |
| title_short | Blame mitigation: a less tidy take and its philosophical implications |
| title_sort | blame mitigation a less tidy take and its philosophical implications |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT daiglejl blamemitigationalesstidytakeanditsphilosophicalimplications AT demareecottonj blamemitigationalesstidytakeanditsphilosophicalimplications |