Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions

Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent to which trust can be...

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Main Author: Toussaert, S
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2017
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author Toussaert, S
author_facet Toussaert, S
author_sort Toussaert, S
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description Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent to which trust can be credibly signaled. I find that the introduction of noise threatens the onset of trust relations and induces players to form more pessimistic beliefs. Therefore policies that increase transparency of the decision-making environment may foster prosociality. However, the potential impact of such policies could be limited by a large heterogeneity in how individuals respond to changes in their information environment.
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spelling oxford-uuid:561e1973-c94d-437b-b549-5d7c5aa2fcb02022-03-26T16:48:17ZIntention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentionsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:561e1973-c94d-437b-b549-5d7c5aa2fcb0EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordElsevier2017Toussaert, SMany experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent to which trust can be credibly signaled. I find that the introduction of noise threatens the onset of trust relations and induces players to form more pessimistic beliefs. Therefore policies that increase transparency of the decision-making environment may foster prosociality. However, the potential impact of such policies could be limited by a large heterogeneity in how individuals respond to changes in their information environment.
spellingShingle Toussaert, S
Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions
title Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions
title_full Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions
title_fullStr Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions
title_full_unstemmed Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions
title_short Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions
title_sort intention based reciprocity and signaling of intentions
work_keys_str_mv AT toussaerts intentionbasedreciprocityandsignalingofintentions