Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions
Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent to which trust can be...
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2017
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_version_ | 1797069423773745152 |
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author | Toussaert, S |
author_facet | Toussaert, S |
author_sort | Toussaert, S |
collection | OXFORD |
description | Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent to which trust can be credibly signaled. I find that the introduction of noise threatens the onset of trust relations and induces players to form more pessimistic beliefs. Therefore policies that increase transparency of the decision-making environment may foster prosociality. However, the potential impact of such policies could be limited by a large heterogeneity in how individuals respond to changes in their information environment. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:24:15Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:561e1973-c94d-437b-b549-5d7c5aa2fcb0 |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:24:15Z |
publishDate | 2017 |
publisher | Elsevier |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:561e1973-c94d-437b-b549-5d7c5aa2fcb02022-03-26T16:48:17ZIntention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentionsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:561e1973-c94d-437b-b549-5d7c5aa2fcb0EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordElsevier2017Toussaert, SMany experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent to which trust can be credibly signaled. I find that the introduction of noise threatens the onset of trust relations and induces players to form more pessimistic beliefs. Therefore policies that increase transparency of the decision-making environment may foster prosociality. However, the potential impact of such policies could be limited by a large heterogeneity in how individuals respond to changes in their information environment. |
spellingShingle | Toussaert, S Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions |
title | Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions |
title_full | Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions |
title_fullStr | Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions |
title_full_unstemmed | Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions |
title_short | Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions |
title_sort | intention based reciprocity and signaling of intentions |
work_keys_str_mv | AT toussaerts intentionbasedreciprocityandsignalingofintentions |