Acquiring a new concept is not explicable-by-content
Carey's book describes many cases in which children develop new concepts with expressive power that could not be constructed out of their input. How does she side-step Fodor's paradox of radical concept nativism? I suggest that it is by rejecting the tacit assumption that psychology can on...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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2011
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| Summary: | Carey's book describes many cases in which children develop new concepts with expressive power that could not be constructed out of their input. How does she side-step Fodor's paradox of radical concept nativism? I suggest that it is by rejecting the tacit assumption that psychology can only explain concept acquisition when it occurs by rational inference or other transitions that are explicable-by-content. © 2011 Cambridge University Press. |
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