Gödelian platonism and mathematical intuition
This paper has two key aims. The first is to clarify the nature of Gödel's platonism. I offer an interpretation of Gödel's remarks on realism and intuition from which a clarified Gödelian position, called conceptual platonism, can be extracted. The second aim is to assess the philosophical...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021
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| _version_ | 1797107832294735872 |
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| author | Wrigley, W |
| author_facet | Wrigley, W |
| author_sort | Wrigley, W |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This paper has two key aims. The first is to clarify the nature of Gödel's platonism. I offer an interpretation of Gödel's remarks on realism and intuition from which a clarified Gödelian position, called conceptual platonism, can be extracted. The second aim is to assess the philosophical merits of this theory. I defend it from charges of mysticism and theology, arguing instead that conceptual platonism is problematic for a more familiar reason. Given the familiarity of this problem, there are implications for a broad family of views in the philosophy of mathematics. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:21:12Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:5672531c-9b96-4f64-91d3-1a5da4f8f5e0 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:21:12Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:5672531c-9b96-4f64-91d3-1a5da4f8f5e02022-10-14T09:37:01ZGödelian platonism and mathematical intuitionJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:5672531c-9b96-4f64-91d3-1a5da4f8f5e0EnglishSymplectic ElementsWiley2021Wrigley, WThis paper has two key aims. The first is to clarify the nature of Gödel's platonism. I offer an interpretation of Gödel's remarks on realism and intuition from which a clarified Gödelian position, called conceptual platonism, can be extracted. The second aim is to assess the philosophical merits of this theory. I defend it from charges of mysticism and theology, arguing instead that conceptual platonism is problematic for a more familiar reason. Given the familiarity of this problem, there are implications for a broad family of views in the philosophy of mathematics. |
| spellingShingle | Wrigley, W Gödelian platonism and mathematical intuition |
| title | Gödelian platonism and mathematical intuition |
| title_full | Gödelian platonism and mathematical intuition |
| title_fullStr | Gödelian platonism and mathematical intuition |
| title_full_unstemmed | Gödelian platonism and mathematical intuition |
| title_short | Gödelian platonism and mathematical intuition |
| title_sort | godelian platonism and mathematical intuition |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT wrigleyw godelianplatonismandmathematicalintuition |