Cognitive ability and learning to play equilibrium: a level-k analysis
In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability influences behavior, success and theevolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behaviorin a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitiveability: more cognitively able s...
Hlavní autoři: | , |
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Médium: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2013
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_version_ | 1826273280160432128 |
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author | Gill, D Prowse, V |
author_facet | Gill, D Prowse, V |
author_sort | Gill, D |
collection | OXFORD |
description | In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability influences behavior, success and theevolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behaviorin a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitiveability: more cognitively able subjects choose numbers closer to equilibrium, converge morefrequently to equilibrium play and earn more even as behavior approaches the equilibriumprediction. To understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently,we estimate a structural model of learning based on level-k reasoning. We find asystematic positive relationship between cognitive ability and levels; furthermore, the averagelevel of more cognitively able subjects responds positively to the cognitive ability of theiropponents, while the average level of less cognitively able subjects does not respond at all.Our results suggest that, in strategic environments, higher cognitive ability translates intobetter analytic reasoning and a better 'theory of mind |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:25:47Z |
format | Working paper |
id | oxford-uuid:56a14ea9-3f9b-4bdc-8b28-7117b6bd2cfd |
institution | University of Oxford |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:25:47Z |
publishDate | 2013 |
publisher | University of Oxford |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:56a14ea9-3f9b-4bdc-8b28-7117b6bd2cfd2022-03-26T16:51:24ZCognitive ability and learning to play equilibrium: a level-k analysisWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:56a14ea9-3f9b-4bdc-8b28-7117b6bd2cfdBulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2013Gill, DProwse, VIn this paper we investigate how cognitive ability influences behavior, success and theevolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behaviorin a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitiveability: more cognitively able subjects choose numbers closer to equilibrium, converge morefrequently to equilibrium play and earn more even as behavior approaches the equilibriumprediction. To understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently,we estimate a structural model of learning based on level-k reasoning. We find asystematic positive relationship between cognitive ability and levels; furthermore, the averagelevel of more cognitively able subjects responds positively to the cognitive ability of theiropponents, while the average level of less cognitively able subjects does not respond at all.Our results suggest that, in strategic environments, higher cognitive ability translates intobetter analytic reasoning and a better 'theory of mind |
spellingShingle | Gill, D Prowse, V Cognitive ability and learning to play equilibrium: a level-k analysis |
title | Cognitive ability and learning to play equilibrium: a level-k analysis |
title_full | Cognitive ability and learning to play equilibrium: a level-k analysis |
title_fullStr | Cognitive ability and learning to play equilibrium: a level-k analysis |
title_full_unstemmed | Cognitive ability and learning to play equilibrium: a level-k analysis |
title_short | Cognitive ability and learning to play equilibrium: a level-k analysis |
title_sort | cognitive ability and learning to play equilibrium a level k analysis |
work_keys_str_mv | AT gilld cognitiveabilityandlearningtoplayequilibriumalevelkanalysis AT prowsev cognitiveabilityandlearningtoplayequilibriumalevelkanalysis |