Breakdowns
We study a continuous‐time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we find...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.
2015
|
| _version_ | 1797069558696116224 |
|---|---|
| author | Keller, G Rady, S |
| author_facet | Keller, G Rady, S |
| author_sort | Keller, G |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We study a continuous‐time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we find that the cooperative value function does not exhibit smooth pasting at the efficient cutoff belief. This finding extends to the boundaries between continuation and stopping regions in Markov perfect equilibria. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium, construct a class of asymmetric equilibria, and elucidate the impact of bad versus good Poisson news on equilibrium outcomes. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:26:14Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:56bed3e3-8ea8-40ba-8b2e-b8b3daaf3edd |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:26:14Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | John Wiley and Sons, Ltd. |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:56bed3e3-8ea8-40ba-8b2e-b8b3daaf3edd2022-03-26T16:52:20ZBreakdownsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:56bed3e3-8ea8-40ba-8b2e-b8b3daaf3eddEnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordJohn Wiley and Sons, Ltd.2015Keller, GRady, SWe study a continuous‐time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we find that the cooperative value function does not exhibit smooth pasting at the efficient cutoff belief. This finding extends to the boundaries between continuation and stopping regions in Markov perfect equilibria. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium, construct a class of asymmetric equilibria, and elucidate the impact of bad versus good Poisson news on equilibrium outcomes. |
| spellingShingle | Keller, G Rady, S Breakdowns |
| title | Breakdowns |
| title_full | Breakdowns |
| title_fullStr | Breakdowns |
| title_full_unstemmed | Breakdowns |
| title_short | Breakdowns |
| title_sort | breakdowns |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kellerg breakdowns AT radys breakdowns |