Indicative conditionals and epistemic luminosity
Kevin Dorst has recently pointed out an apparently puzzling consequence of denying epistemic luminosity: given some natural-sounding bridging principles between knowledge, credence, and indicative conditionals, the denial of epistemic luminosity licenses the knowledge and assertability of abominable...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford University Press
2021
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| _version_ | 1826273352771174400 |
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| author | Hewson, M Kirkpatrick, JR |
| author_facet | Hewson, M Kirkpatrick, JR |
| author_sort | Hewson, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Kevin Dorst has recently pointed out an apparently puzzling consequence of denying epistemic luminosity: given some natural-sounding bridging principles between knowledge, credence, and indicative conditionals, the denial of epistemic luminosity licenses the knowledge and assertability of abominable-sounding conditionals of the form ┌If I don’t know that ϕ, then ϕ┐. We provide a general and systematic examination of this datum by testing Dorst’s claim against various semantics for the indicative conditional in the setting of epistemic logic. Our conclusion is that, regardless of whether knowledge is luminous, the knowability of these conditionals is highly sensitive to the correct semantic analysis of the indicative conditional. Moreover, standard pragmatic resources can explain away the infelicity of such assertions. As it stands, the datum does not tell against epistemic non-luminosity. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:26:53Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:56f4ada4-d8e3-4df7-a0f4-6456e50c3f54 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:26:53Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:56f4ada4-d8e3-4df7-a0f4-6456e50c3f542022-03-26T16:53:41ZIndicative conditionals and epistemic luminosityJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:56f4ada4-d8e3-4df7-a0f4-6456e50c3f54EnglishSymplectic ElementsOxford University Press2021Hewson, MKirkpatrick, JRKevin Dorst has recently pointed out an apparently puzzling consequence of denying epistemic luminosity: given some natural-sounding bridging principles between knowledge, credence, and indicative conditionals, the denial of epistemic luminosity licenses the knowledge and assertability of abominable-sounding conditionals of the form ┌If I don’t know that ϕ, then ϕ┐. We provide a general and systematic examination of this datum by testing Dorst’s claim against various semantics for the indicative conditional in the setting of epistemic logic. Our conclusion is that, regardless of whether knowledge is luminous, the knowability of these conditionals is highly sensitive to the correct semantic analysis of the indicative conditional. Moreover, standard pragmatic resources can explain away the infelicity of such assertions. As it stands, the datum does not tell against epistemic non-luminosity. |
| spellingShingle | Hewson, M Kirkpatrick, JR Indicative conditionals and epistemic luminosity |
| title | Indicative conditionals and epistemic luminosity |
| title_full | Indicative conditionals and epistemic luminosity |
| title_fullStr | Indicative conditionals and epistemic luminosity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Indicative conditionals and epistemic luminosity |
| title_short | Indicative conditionals and epistemic luminosity |
| title_sort | indicative conditionals and epistemic luminosity |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hewsonm indicativeconditionalsandepistemicluminosity AT kirkpatrickjr indicativeconditionalsandepistemicluminosity |