False-Name-Proof Recommendations in Social Networks
We study the problem of finding a recommendation for an uninformed user in a social network by weighting and aggregating the opinions offered by the informed users in the network. In social networks, an informed user may try to manipulate the recommendation by performing a false-name manipulation, w...
Main Authors: | Brill, M, Freeman, R, Conitzer, V, Shah, N |
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Format: | Conference item |
Published: |
Association for Computing Machinery
2016
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