The only dance in town: unique equilibrium in a generalized model of price competition

We study a canonical model of simultaneous price competition between firms thatWe study a canonical model of simultaneous price competition between firms thatsell a homogeneous good to consumers who are characterized by the number ofprices they are exogenously aware of. Our setting subsumes many emp...

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Main Author: Ronayne, D
Format: Working paper
Published: University of Oxford 2020
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author Ronayne, D
author_facet Ronayne, D
author_sort Ronayne, D
collection OXFORD
description We study a canonical model of simultaneous price competition between firms thatWe study a canonical model of simultaneous price competition between firms thatsell a homogeneous good to consumers who are characterized by the number ofprices they are exogenously aware of. Our setting subsumes many employed in theliterature over the last several decades. We show there is a unique equilibrium ifand only if there exist some consumers who are aware of exactly two prices. Theequilibrium we derive is in symmetric mixed strategies. Furthermore, when thereare no consumers aware of exactly two prices, we show there is an uncountableinfinityof asymmetric equilibria in addition to the symmetric equilibrium. Ourresults show the paradigm generically produces a unique equilibrium. We also showthat the commonly-sought symmetric equilibrium (which also nests the textbookBertrand pure strategy equilibrium as a special case) is robust to perturbations inconsumer behavior, while the asymmetric equilibria are not. Revised March 2020.
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spelling oxford-uuid:56ff7d71-f96c-4574-9b89-d3187774d2f12022-03-26T16:53:54ZThe only dance in town: unique equilibrium in a generalized model of price competitionWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:56ff7d71-f96c-4574-9b89-d3187774d2f1Symplectic ElementsBulk import via SwordUniversity of Oxford2020Ronayne, DWe study a canonical model of simultaneous price competition between firms thatWe study a canonical model of simultaneous price competition between firms thatsell a homogeneous good to consumers who are characterized by the number ofprices they are exogenously aware of. Our setting subsumes many employed in theliterature over the last several decades. We show there is a unique equilibrium ifand only if there exist some consumers who are aware of exactly two prices. Theequilibrium we derive is in symmetric mixed strategies. Furthermore, when thereare no consumers aware of exactly two prices, we show there is an uncountableinfinityof asymmetric equilibria in addition to the symmetric equilibrium. Ourresults show the paradigm generically produces a unique equilibrium. We also showthat the commonly-sought symmetric equilibrium (which also nests the textbookBertrand pure strategy equilibrium as a special case) is robust to perturbations inconsumer behavior, while the asymmetric equilibria are not. Revised March 2020.
spellingShingle Ronayne, D
The only dance in town: unique equilibrium in a generalized model of price competition
title The only dance in town: unique equilibrium in a generalized model of price competition
title_full The only dance in town: unique equilibrium in a generalized model of price competition
title_fullStr The only dance in town: unique equilibrium in a generalized model of price competition
title_full_unstemmed The only dance in town: unique equilibrium in a generalized model of price competition
title_short The only dance in town: unique equilibrium in a generalized model of price competition
title_sort only dance in town unique equilibrium in a generalized model of price competition
work_keys_str_mv AT ronayned theonlydanceintownuniqueequilibriuminageneralizedmodelofpricecompetition
AT ronayned onlydanceintownuniqueequilibriuminageneralizedmodelofpricecompetition