Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games.
In the context of a “beauty contest” coordination game (in which payoffs depend on the quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and from the average action) players choose how much costly attention to pay to various informative signals. Each signal has an underlying accuracy (...
Główni autorzy: | Myatt, D, Wallace, C |
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Format: | Working paper |
Język: | English |
Wydane: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2010
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