The fiscal benefits of repeated cooperation: coalitions and debt dynamics in 36 democracies
Do coalition governments really suffer from short time horizons in fiscal policymaking, as posited by standard political-economy models? This article focusses on coalitions that have created high levels of familiarity through shared governing experiences in the past and that are likely to cooperate...
Main Author: | Weisstanner, D |
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Format: | Journal article |
Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2016
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