| Summary: | This book examines the ways in which contractual obligations can be discharged other than by performance. It argues that three such ways—discharge following breach, frustration, and common mistake—traditionally have been, still can be, and certainly should be, explained as instances of the discharge of contractual obligations for failure of condition. The reason one or both parties are discharged from their obligations in such cases is that their obligations were expressly or implicitly conditional on the existence of facts that do not exist or the occurrence of events that have not occurred.
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This is the way in which English law understood these instances of discharge for hundreds of years. But the modern view is that English law has a doctrine of termination for breach, a doctrine of frustration, and a doctrine of common mistake, none of which depend on the conditional nature of obligations to perform. These doctrines are said to be independent of one another, and links based on their historical roots are said to be misleading. The result is three separate doctrines, all in want of justification and giving rise to their own problems in practice.
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This book advocates for a return to the earlier and better understanding of the discharge of contractual obligations—a return to the contract law that modern contract lawyers have forgotten.
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