Implementing Walrasian equilibrium: the languages of product-mix auctions

Product-mix auctions are sealed-bid mechanisms for trading multiple divisible or indivisible units of multiple differentiated goods. They implement competitive-equilibrium allocations when these exist, based on the bids that participants make in a simple geometric language. All concave substitutes (...

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Main Authors: Baldwin, E, Klemperer, P, Lock, E
Format: Working paper
Language:English
Published: University of Oxford 2024
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author Baldwin, E
Klemperer, P
Lock, E
author_facet Baldwin, E
Klemperer, P
Lock, E
author_sort Baldwin, E
collection OXFORD
description Product-mix auctions are sealed-bid mechanisms for trading multiple divisible or indivisible units of multiple differentiated goods. They implement competitive-equilibrium allocations when these exist, based on the bids that participants make in a simple geometric language. All concave substitutes (respectively, strong-substitutes) valuations can be uniquely represented, and no other valuations can be represented, by bids in the corresponding version of this language. This provides new characterisations of ordinary substitutes, and of strong substitutes, when goods are indivisible. We discuss implementation of the auctions, and extensions and variants of the language, e.g., allowing for budget constraints.
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spelling oxford-uuid:590400c3-7976-4869-9870-72db032fd7212024-12-11T09:18:39ZImplementing Walrasian equilibrium: the languages of product-mix auctionsWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:590400c3-7976-4869-9870-72db032fd721EnglishSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2024Baldwin, EKlemperer, PLock, EProduct-mix auctions are sealed-bid mechanisms for trading multiple divisible or indivisible units of multiple differentiated goods. They implement competitive-equilibrium allocations when these exist, based on the bids that participants make in a simple geometric language. All concave substitutes (respectively, strong-substitutes) valuations can be uniquely represented, and no other valuations can be represented, by bids in the corresponding version of this language. This provides new characterisations of ordinary substitutes, and of strong substitutes, when goods are indivisible. We discuss implementation of the auctions, and extensions and variants of the language, e.g., allowing for budget constraints.
spellingShingle Baldwin, E
Klemperer, P
Lock, E
Implementing Walrasian equilibrium: the languages of product-mix auctions
title Implementing Walrasian equilibrium: the languages of product-mix auctions
title_full Implementing Walrasian equilibrium: the languages of product-mix auctions
title_fullStr Implementing Walrasian equilibrium: the languages of product-mix auctions
title_full_unstemmed Implementing Walrasian equilibrium: the languages of product-mix auctions
title_short Implementing Walrasian equilibrium: the languages of product-mix auctions
title_sort implementing walrasian equilibrium the languages of product mix auctions
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AT klempererp implementingwalrasianequilibriumthelanguagesofproductmixauctions
AT locke implementingwalrasianequilibriumthelanguagesofproductmixauctions