Modelling deep indeterminacy

This paper constructs a model of metaphysical indeterminacy that can accommodate a kind of ‘deep’ worldly indeterminacy that arguably arises in quantum mechanics via the Kochen–Specker theorem, and that is incompatible with prominent theories of metaphysical indeterminacy such as that in Barnes and...

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Main Authors: Darby, G, Pickup, M
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Springer Netherlands 2019
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author Darby, G
Pickup, M
author_facet Darby, G
Pickup, M
author_sort Darby, G
collection OXFORD
description This paper constructs a model of metaphysical indeterminacy that can accommodate a kind of ‘deep’ worldly indeterminacy that arguably arises in quantum mechanics via the Kochen–Specker theorem, and that is incompatible with prominent theories of metaphysical indeterminacy such as that in Barnes and Williams (Oxf Stud Metaphys 6:103–148, 2011). We construct a variant of Barnes and Williams’s theory that avoids this problem. Our version builds on situation semantics and uses incomplete, local situations rather than possible worlds to build a model. We evaluate the resulting theory and contrast it with similar alternatives, concluding that our model successfully captures deep indeterminacy.
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spelling oxford-uuid:59470427-80b8-4f7d-a04a-cc1eab9b67fc2022-03-26T17:08:59ZModelling deep indeterminacyJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:59470427-80b8-4f7d-a04a-cc1eab9b67fcEnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordSpringer Netherlands2019Darby, GPickup, MThis paper constructs a model of metaphysical indeterminacy that can accommodate a kind of ‘deep’ worldly indeterminacy that arguably arises in quantum mechanics via the Kochen–Specker theorem, and that is incompatible with prominent theories of metaphysical indeterminacy such as that in Barnes and Williams (Oxf Stud Metaphys 6:103–148, 2011). We construct a variant of Barnes and Williams’s theory that avoids this problem. Our version builds on situation semantics and uses incomplete, local situations rather than possible worlds to build a model. We evaluate the resulting theory and contrast it with similar alternatives, concluding that our model successfully captures deep indeterminacy.
spellingShingle Darby, G
Pickup, M
Modelling deep indeterminacy
title Modelling deep indeterminacy
title_full Modelling deep indeterminacy
title_fullStr Modelling deep indeterminacy
title_full_unstemmed Modelling deep indeterminacy
title_short Modelling deep indeterminacy
title_sort modelling deep indeterminacy
work_keys_str_mv AT darbyg modellingdeepindeterminacy
AT pickupm modellingdeepindeterminacy