| Summary: | <p>This dissertation explores how American state governments adapted to governing in a new kind of federal union in the three decades following the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. Although existing political histories generally pay only anecdotal attention to the activities of state governments in the early national period, this thesis demonstrates that the creation and implementation of national policy was significantly shaped by interactions between state and federal officials. Minimal manpower and vast distances limited the capacity of the federal government to enforce its own laws across the nation, leaving the federal executive and Congress reliant on the support of state officials and institutions in the implementation of federal policies within the states. The line between state and federal areas of responsibility under the Constitution was often unclear, and the question of which government had the right to legislate in which policy area arose frequently. While state and federal officials regularly disagreed with one another about the interpretation of federal laws and of the Constitution, they learned to resolve these conflicts through negotiation, in most cases avoiding formal litigation. I denominate this pattern of interactions ‘co-ordinated federalism.’</p>
<p>On the basis of archival research in five states, this dissertation builds an administrative history of early American federalism, investigating the impact of intergovernmental interactions on the making and execution of national policies concerning trade and finance, national defence, Indian affairs, and slavery. An introductory chapter summarizes the principal mechanisms by which the state and federal governments conducted their ongoing negotiations, and explores the roles of state governors and legislators in producing regulations, resolutions, and remonstrances designed to influence federal policy. While state governments generally co-operated in the enforcement of federal law, even where it was highly controversial, their considerable capacity for independent action could also pose a threat to the success of federal policies.</p>
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