Feeling pain for the very first time: the normative knowledge argument
In this paper I present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. My argument is inspired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. I ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, I argue, will gain new normative knowledge...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Μορφή: | Journal article |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2010
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| Θέματα: |
| _version_ | 1826273976961204224 |
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| author | Kahane, G |
| author_facet | Kahane, G |
| author_sort | Kahane, G |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | In this paper I present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. My argument is inspired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. I ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, I argue, will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain. This argument present a similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value. I end by suggesting that some debates in meta-ethics and in the philosophy of mind might be more closely intertwined than philosophers in either area would like to believe. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:36:25Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:5a0e4831-5b76-4d28-a49e-f998e0ea72d2 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:36:25Z |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:5a0e4831-5b76-4d28-a49e-f998e0ea72d22022-03-26T17:13:25ZFeeling pain for the very first time: the normative knowledge argumentJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:5a0e4831-5b76-4d28-a49e-f998e0ea72d2Philosophy of mindPhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetWiley-Blackwell2010Kahane, GIn this paper I present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. My argument is inspired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. I ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, I argue, will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain. This argument present a similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value. I end by suggesting that some debates in meta-ethics and in the philosophy of mind might be more closely intertwined than philosophers in either area would like to believe. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy of mind Philosophy Kahane, G Feeling pain for the very first time: the normative knowledge argument |
| title | Feeling pain for the very first time: the normative knowledge argument |
| title_full | Feeling pain for the very first time: the normative knowledge argument |
| title_fullStr | Feeling pain for the very first time: the normative knowledge argument |
| title_full_unstemmed | Feeling pain for the very first time: the normative knowledge argument |
| title_short | Feeling pain for the very first time: the normative knowledge argument |
| title_sort | feeling pain for the very first time the normative knowledge argument |
| topic | Philosophy of mind Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kahaneg feelingpainfortheveryfirsttimethenormativeknowledgeargument |