Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies compared

Control over government portfolios is the key to power over policy and patronage, and it is commonly understood to lie with parties in European democracies. However, since the democratic transitions of the 1990s, Europe has had nearly equal numbers of parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, and...

Olles dieđut

Bibliográfalaš dieđut
Váldodahkkit: Schleiter, P, Jones, E
Materiálatiipa: Journal article
Almmustuhtton: Wiley Blackwell 2009
_version_ 1826274226920751104
author Schleiter, P
Jones, E
author_facet Schleiter, P
Jones, E
author_sort Schleiter, P
collection OXFORD
description Control over government portfolios is the key to power over policy and patronage, and it is commonly understood to lie with parties in European democracies. However, since the democratic transitions of the 1990s, Europe has had nearly equal numbers of parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, and there is evidence that the ability of parties to control government posts in these two regime types differs.As yet, political scientists have a limited understanding of the scale and causes of these differences. In this article a principalagent theoretical explanation is proposed. Data are examined on 28 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies in Europe that shows that differences in party control over government portfolios cannot be understood without reference to the underlying principalagent relationships between voters, elected politicians and governments that characterise Europe’s semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes.
first_indexed 2024-03-06T22:40:14Z
format Journal article
id oxford-uuid:5b4d6d12-a738-4520-acf2-68b8ac38d6c6
institution University of Oxford
last_indexed 2024-03-06T22:40:14Z
publishDate 2009
publisher Wiley Blackwell
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:5b4d6d12-a738-4520-acf2-68b8ac38d6c62022-03-26T17:21:13ZParty government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies comparedJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:5b4d6d12-a738-4520-acf2-68b8ac38d6c6Social Sciences Division - DaisyWiley Blackwell2009Schleiter, PJones, EControl over government portfolios is the key to power over policy and patronage, and it is commonly understood to lie with parties in European democracies. However, since the democratic transitions of the 1990s, Europe has had nearly equal numbers of parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, and there is evidence that the ability of parties to control government posts in these two regime types differs.As yet, political scientists have a limited understanding of the scale and causes of these differences. In this article a principalagent theoretical explanation is proposed. Data are examined on 28 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies in Europe that shows that differences in party control over government portfolios cannot be understood without reference to the underlying principalagent relationships between voters, elected politicians and governments that characterise Europe’s semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes.
spellingShingle Schleiter, P
Jones, E
Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies compared
title Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies compared
title_full Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies compared
title_fullStr Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies compared
title_full_unstemmed Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies compared
title_short Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies compared
title_sort party government in europe parliamentary and semi presidential democracies compared
work_keys_str_mv AT schleiterp partygovernmentineuropeparliamentaryandsemipresidentialdemocraciescompared
AT jonese partygovernmentineuropeparliamentaryandsemipresidentialdemocraciescompared