Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets.

In an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related, should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector? This paper assumes that monopoly pricing behavior is regulated and, therefore, the effect of vertical integra...

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Main Author: Vickers, J
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: 1995
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author Vickers, J
author_facet Vickers, J
author_sort Vickers, J
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description In an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related, should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector? This paper assumes that monopoly pricing behavior is regulated and, therefore, the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis. When vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed, the regulator's task is made harder as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals' costs. On the other hand, integration may lead to less duplication of fixed costs. The overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous.
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spelling oxford-uuid:5bb12bd3-65e9-4723-b73f-de0a77dd4c282022-03-26T17:23:32ZCompetition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:5bb12bd3-65e9-4723-b73f-de0a77dd4c28EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints1995Vickers, JIn an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related, should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector? This paper assumes that monopoly pricing behavior is regulated and, therefore, the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis. When vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed, the regulator's task is made harder as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals' costs. On the other hand, integration may lead to less duplication of fixed costs. The overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous.
spellingShingle Vickers, J
Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets.
title Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets.
title_full Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets.
title_fullStr Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets.
title_full_unstemmed Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets.
title_short Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets.
title_sort competition and regulation in vertically related markets
work_keys_str_mv AT vickersj competitionandregulationinverticallyrelatedmarkets