The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations
This paper investigates how counterterrorism that targets terrorist leaders, and thereby undermines control within terrorist organizations, affects terrorist attacks. The paper exploits a natural experiment provided by strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) 'hitting' and 'missin...
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Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2019
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author | Rigterink, A |
author_facet | Rigterink, A |
author_sort | Rigterink, A |
collection | OXFORD |
description | This paper investigates how counterterrorism that targets terrorist leaders, and thereby undermines control within terrorist organizations, affects terrorist attacks. The paper exploits a natural experiment provided by strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) 'hitting' and 'missing' terrorist leaders in Pakistan. Results suggest that terrorist groups increase the number of attacks they commit after a drone 'hit' on their leader, compared to after a 'miss'. This increase amounts to 29 terrorist attacks (43%) worldwide per group in the six months after a drone strike. Game theory provides several explanations for the observed effect. Additional analysis of heterogenous effects across groups, and the impact of drone hits on the timing, type and target of attacks, attacks by affiliated terrorist groups, infighting and group splintering, indicates that aggravated problems of control (principal-agent and collective action problems) explain these results better than alternative theoretical mechanisms. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:41:40Z |
format | Working paper |
id | oxford-uuid:5bc8e33f-bc4e-46aa-b864-6498e188e575 |
institution | University of Oxford |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:41:40Z |
publishDate | 2019 |
publisher | University of Oxford |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:5bc8e33f-bc4e-46aa-b864-6498e188e5752022-03-26T17:24:07ZThe wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizationsWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:5bc8e33f-bc4e-46aa-b864-6498e188e575Bulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2019Rigterink, AThis paper investigates how counterterrorism that targets terrorist leaders, and thereby undermines control within terrorist organizations, affects terrorist attacks. The paper exploits a natural experiment provided by strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) 'hitting' and 'missing' terrorist leaders in Pakistan. Results suggest that terrorist groups increase the number of attacks they commit after a drone 'hit' on their leader, compared to after a 'miss'. This increase amounts to 29 terrorist attacks (43%) worldwide per group in the six months after a drone strike. Game theory provides several explanations for the observed effect. Additional analysis of heterogenous effects across groups, and the impact of drone hits on the timing, type and target of attacks, attacks by affiliated terrorist groups, infighting and group splintering, indicates that aggravated problems of control (principal-agent and collective action problems) explain these results better than alternative theoretical mechanisms. |
spellingShingle | Rigterink, A The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations |
title | The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations |
title_full | The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations |
title_fullStr | The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations |
title_full_unstemmed | The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations |
title_short | The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations |
title_sort | wane of command evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations |
work_keys_str_mv | AT rigterinka thewaneofcommandevidenceondronestrikesandcontrolwithinterroristorganizations AT rigterinka waneofcommandevidenceondronestrikesandcontrolwithinterroristorganizations |