The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations

This paper investigates how counterterrorism that targets terrorist leaders, and thereby undermines control within terrorist organizations, affects terrorist attacks. The paper exploits a natural experiment provided by strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) 'hitting' and 'missin...

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Main Author: Rigterink, A
Format: Working paper
Published: University of Oxford 2019
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author Rigterink, A
author_facet Rigterink, A
author_sort Rigterink, A
collection OXFORD
description This paper investigates how counterterrorism that targets terrorist leaders, and thereby undermines control within terrorist organizations, affects terrorist attacks. The paper exploits a natural experiment provided by strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) 'hitting' and 'missing' terrorist leaders in Pakistan. Results suggest that terrorist groups increase the number of attacks they commit after a drone 'hit' on their leader, compared to after a 'miss'. This increase amounts to 29 terrorist attacks (43%) worldwide per group in the six months after a drone strike. Game theory provides several explanations for the observed effect. Additional analysis of heterogenous effects across groups, and the impact of drone hits on the timing, type and target of attacks, attacks by affiliated terrorist groups, infighting and group splintering, indicates that aggravated problems of control (principal-agent and collective action problems) explain these results better than alternative theoretical mechanisms.
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spelling oxford-uuid:5bc8e33f-bc4e-46aa-b864-6498e188e5752022-03-26T17:24:07ZThe wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizationsWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:5bc8e33f-bc4e-46aa-b864-6498e188e575Bulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2019Rigterink, AThis paper investigates how counterterrorism that targets terrorist leaders, and thereby undermines control within terrorist organizations, affects terrorist attacks. The paper exploits a natural experiment provided by strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) 'hitting' and 'missing' terrorist leaders in Pakistan. Results suggest that terrorist groups increase the number of attacks they commit after a drone 'hit' on their leader, compared to after a 'miss'. This increase amounts to 29 terrorist attacks (43%) worldwide per group in the six months after a drone strike. Game theory provides several explanations for the observed effect. Additional analysis of heterogenous effects across groups, and the impact of drone hits on the timing, type and target of attacks, attacks by affiliated terrorist groups, infighting and group splintering, indicates that aggravated problems of control (principal-agent and collective action problems) explain these results better than alternative theoretical mechanisms.
spellingShingle Rigterink, A
The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations
title The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations
title_full The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations
title_fullStr The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations
title_full_unstemmed The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations
title_short The wane of command: evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations
title_sort wane of command evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations
work_keys_str_mv AT rigterinka thewaneofcommandevidenceondronestrikesandcontrolwithinterroristorganizations
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