Exposing the Vanities-and a Qualified Defense-of Mechanistic Reasoning in Health Care Decision Making

Philosophers of science have insisted that evidence of underlying mechanisms is required to support claims about the effects of medical interventions. Yet evidence about mechanisms does not feature on dominant evidence-based medicine "hierarchies." After arguing that only inferences from m...

Volledige beschrijving

Bibliografische gegevens
Hoofdauteur: Howick, J
Formaat: Journal article
Taal:English
Gepubliceerd in: 2011
_version_ 1826274375796523008
author Howick, J
author_facet Howick, J
author_sort Howick, J
collection OXFORD
description Philosophers of science have insisted that evidence of underlying mechanisms is required to support claims about the effects of medical interventions. Yet evidence about mechanisms does not feature on dominant evidence-based medicine "hierarchies." After arguing that only inferences from mechanisms ("mechanistic reasoning")-not mechanisms themselves-count as evidence, I argue for a middle ground. Mechanistic reasoning is not required to establish causation when we have high-quality controlled studies; moreover, mechanistic reasoning is more problematic than has been assumed. Yet where the problems can be overcome, mechanistic reasoning can and should be used as evidence. © 2011 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All right reserved.
first_indexed 2024-03-06T22:42:29Z
format Journal article
id oxford-uuid:5c0f5cd9-a657-4876-901c-096f72d9c6a4
institution University of Oxford
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-06T22:42:29Z
publishDate 2011
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:5c0f5cd9-a657-4876-901c-096f72d9c6a42022-03-26T17:25:51ZExposing the Vanities-and a Qualified Defense-of Mechanistic Reasoning in Health Care Decision MakingJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:5c0f5cd9-a657-4876-901c-096f72d9c6a4EnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2011Howick, JPhilosophers of science have insisted that evidence of underlying mechanisms is required to support claims about the effects of medical interventions. Yet evidence about mechanisms does not feature on dominant evidence-based medicine "hierarchies." After arguing that only inferences from mechanisms ("mechanistic reasoning")-not mechanisms themselves-count as evidence, I argue for a middle ground. Mechanistic reasoning is not required to establish causation when we have high-quality controlled studies; moreover, mechanistic reasoning is more problematic than has been assumed. Yet where the problems can be overcome, mechanistic reasoning can and should be used as evidence. © 2011 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All right reserved.
spellingShingle Howick, J
Exposing the Vanities-and a Qualified Defense-of Mechanistic Reasoning in Health Care Decision Making
title Exposing the Vanities-and a Qualified Defense-of Mechanistic Reasoning in Health Care Decision Making
title_full Exposing the Vanities-and a Qualified Defense-of Mechanistic Reasoning in Health Care Decision Making
title_fullStr Exposing the Vanities-and a Qualified Defense-of Mechanistic Reasoning in Health Care Decision Making
title_full_unstemmed Exposing the Vanities-and a Qualified Defense-of Mechanistic Reasoning in Health Care Decision Making
title_short Exposing the Vanities-and a Qualified Defense-of Mechanistic Reasoning in Health Care Decision Making
title_sort exposing the vanities and a qualified defense of mechanistic reasoning in health care decision making
work_keys_str_mv AT howickj exposingthevanitiesandaqualifieddefenseofmechanisticreasoninginhealthcaredecisionmaking