Strict Finitism and the Happy Sorites.

Call an argument a 'happy sorites' if it is a sorites argument with true premises and a false conclusion. It is a striking fact that although most philosophers working on the sorites paradox find it at prima facie highly compelling that the premises of the sorites paradox are true and its...

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Main Author: Magidor, O
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: 2012
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author Magidor, O
author_facet Magidor, O
author_sort Magidor, O
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description Call an argument a 'happy sorites' if it is a sorites argument with true premises and a false conclusion. It is a striking fact that although most philosophers working on the sorites paradox find it at prima facie highly compelling that the premises of the sorites paradox are true and its conclusion false, few (if any) of the standard theories on the issue ultimately allow for happy sorites arguments. There is one philosophical view, however, that appears to allow for at least some happy sorites arguments: strict finitism in the philosophy of mathematics. My aim in this paper is to explore to what extent this appearance is accurate. As we shall see, this question is far from trivial. In particular, I will discuss two arguments that threaten to show that strict finitism cannot consistently accept happy sorites arguments, but I will argue that (given reasonable assumptions on strict finitistic logic) these arguments can ultimately be avoided, and the view can indeed allow for happy sorites arguments. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
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spelling oxford-uuid:5cc9cfc8-7c41-428a-af56-c290176288c72022-03-26T17:30:19ZStrict Finitism and the Happy Sorites.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:5cc9cfc8-7c41-428a-af56-c290176288c7EnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2012Magidor, OCall an argument a 'happy sorites' if it is a sorites argument with true premises and a false conclusion. It is a striking fact that although most philosophers working on the sorites paradox find it at prima facie highly compelling that the premises of the sorites paradox are true and its conclusion false, few (if any) of the standard theories on the issue ultimately allow for happy sorites arguments. There is one philosophical view, however, that appears to allow for at least some happy sorites arguments: strict finitism in the philosophy of mathematics. My aim in this paper is to explore to what extent this appearance is accurate. As we shall see, this question is far from trivial. In particular, I will discuss two arguments that threaten to show that strict finitism cannot consistently accept happy sorites arguments, but I will argue that (given reasonable assumptions on strict finitistic logic) these arguments can ultimately be avoided, and the view can indeed allow for happy sorites arguments. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
spellingShingle Magidor, O
Strict Finitism and the Happy Sorites.
title Strict Finitism and the Happy Sorites.
title_full Strict Finitism and the Happy Sorites.
title_fullStr Strict Finitism and the Happy Sorites.
title_full_unstemmed Strict Finitism and the Happy Sorites.
title_short Strict Finitism and the Happy Sorites.
title_sort strict finitism and the happy sorites
work_keys_str_mv AT magidoro strictfinitismandthehappysorites