Inferring school quality from rankings: the impact of school choice
School choice reforms allow families to apply to non-local schools and assign additional funding to schools based on families' demand. For these reforms to promote high-quality schools, families need to infer school quality from past performance, but past performance also depends on student abi...
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Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2015
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author | Herresthal, C |
author_facet | Herresthal, C |
author_sort | Herresthal, C |
collection | OXFORD |
description | School choice reforms allow families to apply to non-local schools and assign additional funding to schools based on families' demand. For these reforms to promote high-quality schools, families need to infer school quality from past performance, but past performance also depends on student ability. Because reforms alter the allocation of students to schools, it is unclear whether performance becomes more or less informative about quality. I model families as trading off estimated quality against proximity, and analyze a steady-state Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. I show that performance-based rankings become more informative about quality only if oversubscribed schools can choose whom to accept. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:45:46Z |
format | Working paper |
id | oxford-uuid:5d1e276b-7f53-4037-ad5a-a31c3e5d6a73 |
institution | University of Oxford |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:45:46Z |
publishDate | 2015 |
publisher | University of Oxford |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:5d1e276b-7f53-4037-ad5a-a31c3e5d6a732022-03-26T17:32:25ZInferring school quality from rankings: the impact of school choiceWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:5d1e276b-7f53-4037-ad5a-a31c3e5d6a73Bulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2015Herresthal, CSchool choice reforms allow families to apply to non-local schools and assign additional funding to schools based on families' demand. For these reforms to promote high-quality schools, families need to infer school quality from past performance, but past performance also depends on student ability. Because reforms alter the allocation of students to schools, it is unclear whether performance becomes more or less informative about quality. I model families as trading off estimated quality against proximity, and analyze a steady-state Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. I show that performance-based rankings become more informative about quality only if oversubscribed schools can choose whom to accept. |
spellingShingle | Herresthal, C Inferring school quality from rankings: the impact of school choice |
title | Inferring school quality from rankings: the impact of school choice |
title_full | Inferring school quality from rankings: the impact of school choice |
title_fullStr | Inferring school quality from rankings: the impact of school choice |
title_full_unstemmed | Inferring school quality from rankings: the impact of school choice |
title_short | Inferring school quality from rankings: the impact of school choice |
title_sort | inferring school quality from rankings the impact of school choice |
work_keys_str_mv | AT herresthalc inferringschoolqualityfromrankingstheimpactofschoolchoice |