Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage

We provide evidence that open-end organizational structures undermine incentives for asset managers to attack long-term mispricing. We compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than do open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitra...

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Main Authors: Giannetti, M, Kahraman, C
Format: Journal article
Published: Oxford University Press 2017
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author Giannetti, M
Kahraman, C
author_facet Giannetti, M
Kahraman, C
author_sort Giannetti, M
collection OXFORD
description We provide evidence that open-end organizational structures undermine incentives for asset managers to attack long-term mispricing. We compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than do open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitrage risk. We then show that hedge funds with highshare restrictions having a lower degree of open-endedness also trade against long-term mispricing to a larger extentthan do other hedge funds. Our analysis suggests that open-end organizational structures are not conducive to long-term risky arbitrage.
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spelling oxford-uuid:5daaacd5-dd28-4a3a-b459-2218029af8b02022-03-26T17:35:50ZOpen-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrageJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:5daaacd5-dd28-4a3a-b459-2218029af8b0Symplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2017Giannetti, MKahraman, CWe provide evidence that open-end organizational structures undermine incentives for asset managers to attack long-term mispricing. We compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than do open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitrage risk. We then show that hedge funds with highshare restrictions having a lower degree of open-endedness also trade against long-term mispricing to a larger extentthan do other hedge funds. Our analysis suggests that open-end organizational structures are not conducive to long-term risky arbitrage.
spellingShingle Giannetti, M
Kahraman, C
Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage
title Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage
title_full Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage
title_fullStr Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage
title_full_unstemmed Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage
title_short Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage
title_sort open end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage
work_keys_str_mv AT giannettim openendorganizationalstructuresandlimitstoarbitrage
AT kahramanc openendorganizationalstructuresandlimitstoarbitrage