Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage
We provide evidence that open-end organizational structures undermine incentives for asset managers to attack long-term mispricing. We compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than do open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitra...
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Format: | Journal article |
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Oxford University Press
2017
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author | Giannetti, M Kahraman, C |
author_facet | Giannetti, M Kahraman, C |
author_sort | Giannetti, M |
collection | OXFORD |
description | We provide evidence that open-end organizational structures undermine incentives for asset managers to attack long-term mispricing. We compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than do open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitrage risk. We then show that hedge funds with highshare restrictions having a lower degree of open-endedness also trade against long-term mispricing to a larger extentthan do other hedge funds. Our analysis suggests that open-end organizational structures are not conducive to long-term risky arbitrage. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:47:29Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:5daaacd5-dd28-4a3a-b459-2218029af8b0 |
institution | University of Oxford |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:47:29Z |
publishDate | 2017 |
publisher | Oxford University Press |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:5daaacd5-dd28-4a3a-b459-2218029af8b02022-03-26T17:35:50ZOpen-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrageJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:5daaacd5-dd28-4a3a-b459-2218029af8b0Symplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2017Giannetti, MKahraman, CWe provide evidence that open-end organizational structures undermine incentives for asset managers to attack long-term mispricing. We compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than do open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitrage risk. We then show that hedge funds with highshare restrictions having a lower degree of open-endedness also trade against long-term mispricing to a larger extentthan do other hedge funds. Our analysis suggests that open-end organizational structures are not conducive to long-term risky arbitrage. |
spellingShingle | Giannetti, M Kahraman, C Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage |
title | Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage |
title_full | Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage |
title_fullStr | Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage |
title_full_unstemmed | Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage |
title_short | Open-end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage |
title_sort | open end organizational structures and limits to arbitrage |
work_keys_str_mv | AT giannettim openendorganizationalstructuresandlimitstoarbitrage AT kahramanc openendorganizationalstructuresandlimitstoarbitrage |