Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling.
We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goo...
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Working paper |
| Sprache: | English |
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Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2006
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| _version_ | 1826274839515627520 |
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| author | Browning, M Chiappori, P Lechene, V |
| author_facet | Browning, M Chiappori, P Lechene, V |
| author_sort | Browning, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goods or they contribute to at most one common good. The former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of Lundberg and Pollak (1993). The second outcome yields (local) income pooling. A household will be in different regimes depending on the distribution of income within the household. Any bargaining model with this non-cooperative case as a breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling. We conclude that targeting benefits such as child benefits to one household member may not always have an effect on outcomes. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:49:32Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:5e53dbb6-1a13-4896-a2cf-b47c95ec2ca9 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:49:32Z |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publisher | Department of Economics (University of Oxford) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:5e53dbb6-1a13-4896-a2cf-b47c95ec2ca92022-03-26T17:39:59ZDistributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:5e53dbb6-1a13-4896-a2cf-b47c95ec2ca9EnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2006Browning, MChiappori, PLechene, VWe derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goods or they contribute to at most one common good. The former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of Lundberg and Pollak (1993). The second outcome yields (local) income pooling. A household will be in different regimes depending on the distribution of income within the household. Any bargaining model with this non-cooperative case as a breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling. We conclude that targeting benefits such as child benefits to one household member may not always have an effect on outcomes. |
| spellingShingle | Browning, M Chiappori, P Lechene, V Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling. |
| title | Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling. |
| title_full | Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling. |
| title_fullStr | Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling. |
| title_short | Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling. |
| title_sort | distributional effects in household models separate spheres and income pooling |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT browningm distributionaleffectsinhouseholdmodelsseparatespheresandincomepooling AT chiapporip distributionaleffectsinhouseholdmodelsseparatespheresandincomepooling AT lechenev distributionaleffectsinhouseholdmodelsseparatespheresandincomepooling |