Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling.
We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goo...
Auteurs principaux: | Browning, M, Chiappori, P, Lechene, V |
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Format: | Working paper |
Langue: | English |
Publié: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2006
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