Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling.
We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goo...
Հիմնական հեղինակներ: | Browning, M, Chiappori, P, Lechene, V |
---|---|
Ձևաչափ: | Working paper |
Լեզու: | English |
Հրապարակվել է: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2006
|
Նմանատիպ նյութեր
-
Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling
: Browning, M, և այլն
Հրապարակվել է: (2006) -
Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling.
: Browning, M, և այլն
Հրապարակվել է: (2010) -
Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling
: Browning, M, և այլն
Հրապարակվել է: (2010) -
Tests of income pooling in household decisions
: Lechene, V, և այլն
Հրապարակվել է: (2002) -
Collective and Unitary Models: A Clarification.
: Browning, M, և այլն
Հրապարակվել է: (2006)