The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance

This paper uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and takeover defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly fragmen...

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Main Authors: Jenkinson, T, Ljungqvist, A
Format: Working paper
Published: University of Oxford 1999
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author Jenkinson, T
Ljungqvist, A
author_facet Jenkinson, T
Ljungqvist, A
author_sort Jenkinson, T
collection OXFORD
description This paper uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and takeover defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly fragmented (but not dispersed) ownership in non-majority controlled firms. We document how the accumulation of hostile stakes can be used to gain control of target companies given these ownership patterns. The paper also suggests an important role for banks in helping predators accumulate, and avoid the disclosure of, large stakes.
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spelling oxford-uuid:5f3dc85b-e13a-4372-ad8b-0d68b3bb11fc2022-03-26T17:45:43ZThe role of hostile stakes in German corporate governanceWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:5f3dc85b-e13a-4372-ad8b-0d68b3bb11fcBulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford1999Jenkinson, TLjungqvist, AThis paper uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and takeover defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly fragmented (but not dispersed) ownership in non-majority controlled firms. We document how the accumulation of hostile stakes can be used to gain control of target companies given these ownership patterns. The paper also suggests an important role for banks in helping predators accumulate, and avoid the disclosure of, large stakes.
spellingShingle Jenkinson, T
Ljungqvist, A
The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance
title The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance
title_full The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance
title_fullStr The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance
title_full_unstemmed The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance
title_short The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance
title_sort role of hostile stakes in german corporate governance
work_keys_str_mv AT jenkinsont theroleofhostilestakesingermancorporategovernance
AT ljungqvista theroleofhostilestakesingermancorporategovernance
AT jenkinsont roleofhostilestakesingermancorporategovernance
AT ljungqvista roleofhostilestakesingermancorporategovernance