The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance
This paper uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and takeover defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly fragmen...
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Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
1999
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author | Jenkinson, T Ljungqvist, A |
author_facet | Jenkinson, T Ljungqvist, A |
author_sort | Jenkinson, T |
collection | OXFORD |
description | This paper uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and takeover defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly fragmented (but not dispersed) ownership in non-majority controlled firms. We document how the accumulation of hostile stakes can be used to gain control of target companies given these ownership patterns. The paper also suggests an important role for banks in helping predators accumulate, and avoid the disclosure of, large stakes. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:52:26Z |
format | Working paper |
id | oxford-uuid:5f3dc85b-e13a-4372-ad8b-0d68b3bb11fc |
institution | University of Oxford |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:52:26Z |
publishDate | 1999 |
publisher | University of Oxford |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:5f3dc85b-e13a-4372-ad8b-0d68b3bb11fc2022-03-26T17:45:43ZThe role of hostile stakes in German corporate governanceWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:5f3dc85b-e13a-4372-ad8b-0d68b3bb11fcBulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford1999Jenkinson, TLjungqvist, AThis paper uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and takeover defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly fragmented (but not dispersed) ownership in non-majority controlled firms. We document how the accumulation of hostile stakes can be used to gain control of target companies given these ownership patterns. The paper also suggests an important role for banks in helping predators accumulate, and avoid the disclosure of, large stakes. |
spellingShingle | Jenkinson, T Ljungqvist, A The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance |
title | The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance |
title_full | The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance |
title_fullStr | The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance |
title_full_unstemmed | The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance |
title_short | The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance |
title_sort | role of hostile stakes in german corporate governance |
work_keys_str_mv | AT jenkinsont theroleofhostilestakesingermancorporategovernance AT ljungqvista theroleofhostilestakesingermancorporategovernance AT jenkinsont roleofhostilestakesingermancorporategovernance AT ljungqvista roleofhostilestakesingermancorporategovernance |