| Summary: | <p>The present work is an attempt to lay the groundwork for an account of rule-following that is both philosophically substantive and partially reductive. It is philosophically substantive in contrast with the kind of discourses that exemplify a quietist approach to philosophy. It is partially reductive inasmuch as it proposes to reconstruct the phenomena of rule-following, linguistically or conceptually shaped meaning, and understanding out of materials that do not presuppose either, though without depriving itself altogether of properly intentional resources.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the present work aims to answer two questions: (i) which feature of signs are we responsive to in cases of rule-following? and (ii) what is the relation between these signs and our responses to them in such cases? It does so, not in sterile isolation from any historical anchorage, but through a critical engagement with the writings of three authors: McDowell, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. It is, we could say, an attempt at constructive philosophy which takes form in dialogue. </p>
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