Revealed and concealed preferences in the Chilean pension system: an experimental investigation
Using survey data and a field experiment to measure agents' risk and time preferences, we identify the agent-type that is free to reveal its preferences through decisions about pension system participation. Thus, we show that in Chile the appropriate focus for policy makers interested in the we...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Working paper |
| Publicado: |
University of Oxford
2000
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| _version_ | 1826275283752189952 |
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| author | Barr, A Packard, T |
| author_facet | Barr, A Packard, T |
| author_sort | Barr, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Using survey data and a field experiment to measure agents' risk and time preferences, we identify the agent-type that is free to reveal its preferences through decisions about pension system participation. Thus, we show that in Chile the appropriate focus for policy makers interested in the welfare-enhancing effects of such participation are the self employed. They are indistinguishable from other economically active agents with respect to time and risk preferences and sort into participants and non-participants in the pension system with reference to those preferences. In contrast, employees are rationed. The more patient and less risk averse self employed participate. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:56:21Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:6087467d-108d-4ee7-a3b5-0fc9dfbc409b |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T22:56:21Z |
| publishDate | 2000 |
| publisher | University of Oxford |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:6087467d-108d-4ee7-a3b5-0fc9dfbc409b2022-03-26T17:53:53ZRevealed and concealed preferences in the Chilean pension system: an experimental investigationWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:6087467d-108d-4ee7-a3b5-0fc9dfbc409bSymplectic ElementsBulk import via SwordUniversity of Oxford2000Barr, APackard, TUsing survey data and a field experiment to measure agents' risk and time preferences, we identify the agent-type that is free to reveal its preferences through decisions about pension system participation. Thus, we show that in Chile the appropriate focus for policy makers interested in the welfare-enhancing effects of such participation are the self employed. They are indistinguishable from other economically active agents with respect to time and risk preferences and sort into participants and non-participants in the pension system with reference to those preferences. In contrast, employees are rationed. The more patient and less risk averse self employed participate. |
| spellingShingle | Barr, A Packard, T Revealed and concealed preferences in the Chilean pension system: an experimental investigation |
| title | Revealed and concealed preferences in the Chilean pension system: an experimental investigation |
| title_full | Revealed and concealed preferences in the Chilean pension system: an experimental investigation |
| title_fullStr | Revealed and concealed preferences in the Chilean pension system: an experimental investigation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Revealed and concealed preferences in the Chilean pension system: an experimental investigation |
| title_short | Revealed and concealed preferences in the Chilean pension system: an experimental investigation |
| title_sort | revealed and concealed preferences in the chilean pension system an experimental investigation |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT barra revealedandconcealedpreferencesinthechileanpensionsystemanexperimentalinvestigation AT packardt revealedandconcealedpreferencesinthechileanpensionsystemanexperimentalinvestigation |