Dynamic voting in clubs
<p style="text-align:justify;"> This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by its set of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate is endogenous. Examples range fr...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2015
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| _version_ | 1797072433066278912 |
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| author | Roberts, K |
| author_facet | Roberts, K |
| author_sort | Roberts, K |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p style="text-align:justify;"> This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by its set of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate is endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers’ cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule and the dynamics of clubs are characterized. Two types of club, one where a group funds some public good and the other where a given benefit is shared by the group, are analyzed in detail. </p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:07:34Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:645dcc9b-df6f-45d8-a15d-76b1956beafe |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:07:34Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:645dcc9b-df6f-45d8-a15d-76b1956beafe2022-03-26T18:18:31ZDynamic voting in clubsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:645dcc9b-df6f-45d8-a15d-76b1956beafeEnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordElsevier2015Roberts, K <p style="text-align:justify;"> This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by its set of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate is endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers’ cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule and the dynamics of clubs are characterized. Two types of club, one where a group funds some public good and the other where a given benefit is shared by the group, are analyzed in detail. </p> |
| spellingShingle | Roberts, K Dynamic voting in clubs |
| title | Dynamic voting in clubs |
| title_full | Dynamic voting in clubs |
| title_fullStr | Dynamic voting in clubs |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dynamic voting in clubs |
| title_short | Dynamic voting in clubs |
| title_sort | dynamic voting in clubs |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT robertsk dynamicvotinginclubs |