Vagueness and intuitionistic logic
This chapter considers the question: should we employ intuitionistic logic, not classical logic, when reasoning with vague concepts? In his commentary on Michael Dummett’s “Wang’s Paradox,” Crispin Wright presents an apparently powerful argument in favour of an affirmative answer to this question. T...
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| Μορφή: | Book section |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
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Oxford University Press
2020
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| Περίληψη: | This chapter considers the question: should we employ intuitionistic logic, not classical logic, when reasoning with vague concepts? In his commentary on Michael Dummett’s “Wang’s Paradox,” Crispin Wright presents an apparently powerful argument in favour of an affirmative answer to this question. This chapter advocates a less conclusive answer than Wright’s. It is argued that intuitionistic logic may be the strongest logic we are entitled to use in reasoning with any vague predicate, but there may also be common and central families of vague term where we are entitled to use classical logic. |
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