Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience

In 1997, France Telecom went through a partial privatization. Using a database that tracks over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze employees’ decisions whether to participate; how much to invest; and what stock alternatives to select. The results are broadly consistent with a neoclassical mod...

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Main Authors: Tufano, P, Degeorge, F, Jenter, D, Moel, A
Format: Journal article
Published: 2004
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author Tufano, P
Degeorge, F
Jenter, D
Moel, A
author_facet Tufano, P
Degeorge, F
Jenter, D
Moel, A
author_sort Tufano, P
collection OXFORD
description In 1997, France Telecom went through a partial privatization. Using a database that tracks over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze employees’ decisions whether to participate; how much to invest; and what stock alternatives to select. The results are broadly consistent with a neoclassical model of investing behavior. We report four anomalous findings: (1) The firm specificity of human capital has a negligible effect on employees’ investment decisions; (2) the amount invested seems driven by different forces than the decision to participate, and we attempt to measure an apparent “threshold effect”; (3) employees “left on the table” benefits worth one to two months’ salary by failing to participate; and (4) most participants underweighted the most valuable asset.
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spelling oxford-uuid:654d0837-6d03-4e4c-a7d5-3255316d46962022-03-26T18:24:39ZSelling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's ExperienceJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:654d0837-6d03-4e4c-a7d5-3255316d4696Saïd Business School - Eureka2004Tufano, PDegeorge, FJenter, DMoel, AIn 1997, France Telecom went through a partial privatization. Using a database that tracks over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze employees’ decisions whether to participate; how much to invest; and what stock alternatives to select. The results are broadly consistent with a neoclassical model of investing behavior. We report four anomalous findings: (1) The firm specificity of human capital has a negligible effect on employees’ investment decisions; (2) the amount invested seems driven by different forces than the decision to participate, and we attempt to measure an apparent “threshold effect”; (3) employees “left on the table” benefits worth one to two months’ salary by failing to participate; and (4) most participants underweighted the most valuable asset.
spellingShingle Tufano, P
Degeorge, F
Jenter, D
Moel, A
Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience
title Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience
title_full Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience
title_fullStr Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience
title_full_unstemmed Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience
title_short Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience
title_sort selling company shares to reluctant employees france telecom s experience
work_keys_str_mv AT tufanop sellingcompanysharestoreluctantemployeesfrancetelecomsexperience
AT degeorgef sellingcompanysharestoreluctantemployeesfrancetelecomsexperience
AT jenterd sellingcompanysharestoreluctantemployeesfrancetelecomsexperience
AT moela sellingcompanysharestoreluctantemployeesfrancetelecomsexperience