Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience
In 1997, France Telecom went through a partial privatization. Using a database that tracks over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze employees’ decisions whether to participate; how much to invest; and what stock alternatives to select. The results are broadly consistent with a neoclassical mod...
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Format: | Journal article |
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2004
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author | Tufano, P Degeorge, F Jenter, D Moel, A |
author_facet | Tufano, P Degeorge, F Jenter, D Moel, A |
author_sort | Tufano, P |
collection | OXFORD |
description | In 1997, France Telecom went through a partial privatization. Using a database that tracks over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze employees’ decisions whether to participate; how much to invest; and what stock alternatives to select. The results are broadly consistent with a neoclassical model of investing behavior. We report four anomalous findings: (1) The firm specificity of human capital has a negligible effect on employees’ investment decisions; (2) the amount invested seems driven by different forces than the decision to participate, and we attempt to measure an apparent “threshold effect”; (3) employees “left on the table” benefits worth one to two months’ salary by failing to participate; and (4) most participants underweighted the most valuable asset. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:10:31Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:654d0837-6d03-4e4c-a7d5-3255316d4696 |
institution | University of Oxford |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T23:10:31Z |
publishDate | 2004 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:654d0837-6d03-4e4c-a7d5-3255316d46962022-03-26T18:24:39ZSelling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's ExperienceJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:654d0837-6d03-4e4c-a7d5-3255316d4696Saïd Business School - Eureka2004Tufano, PDegeorge, FJenter, DMoel, AIn 1997, France Telecom went through a partial privatization. Using a database that tracks over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze employees’ decisions whether to participate; how much to invest; and what stock alternatives to select. The results are broadly consistent with a neoclassical model of investing behavior. We report four anomalous findings: (1) The firm specificity of human capital has a negligible effect on employees’ investment decisions; (2) the amount invested seems driven by different forces than the decision to participate, and we attempt to measure an apparent “threshold effect”; (3) employees “left on the table” benefits worth one to two months’ salary by failing to participate; and (4) most participants underweighted the most valuable asset. |
spellingShingle | Tufano, P Degeorge, F Jenter, D Moel, A Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience |
title | Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience |
title_full | Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience |
title_fullStr | Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience |
title_full_unstemmed | Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience |
title_short | Selling Company Shares to Reluctant Employees: France Telecom's Experience |
title_sort | selling company shares to reluctant employees france telecom s experience |
work_keys_str_mv | AT tufanop sellingcompanysharestoreluctantemployeesfrancetelecomsexperience AT degeorgef sellingcompanysharestoreluctantemployeesfrancetelecomsexperience AT jenterd sellingcompanysharestoreluctantemployeesfrancetelecomsexperience AT moela sellingcompanysharestoreluctantemployeesfrancetelecomsexperience |