The conflict-resolution theory of virtue

There has been a long-standing debate in the history of moral thought over the nature of virtue—the enduring traits that are indicative of a good moral character. One tradition—represented by Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and Hume—has celebrated the so-called “pagan” virtues of beauty,...

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Main Author: Curry, O
Other Authors: Sinnot-Armstrong, W
Format: Book section
Published: MIT Press 2017
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author Curry, O
author2 Sinnot-Armstrong, W
author_facet Sinnot-Armstrong, W
Curry, O
author_sort Curry, O
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description There has been a long-standing debate in the history of moral thought over the nature of virtue—the enduring traits that are indicative of a good moral character. One tradition—represented by Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and Hume—has celebrated the so-called “pagan” virtues of beauty, strength, courage, magnanimity, and leadership. Another tradition—represented particularly by theologians—has celebrated exactly the opposite set of traits: the so-called “Christian” virtues of humility, meekness, quietude, asceticism, and obedience (Berlin, 1997). But what are the virtues? Where do they come from? Why do they consist of these two apparently incompatible sets of traits? And why have they been considered moral?
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spelling oxford-uuid:66ac51bc-6f30-4f95-8360-9a8c5322267c2022-03-26T18:33:27ZThe conflict-resolution theory of virtueBook sectionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_3248uuid:66ac51bc-6f30-4f95-8360-9a8c5322267cSymplectic Elements at OxfordMIT Press2017Curry, OSinnot-Armstrong, WThere has been a long-standing debate in the history of moral thought over the nature of virtue—the enduring traits that are indicative of a good moral character. One tradition—represented by Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and Hume—has celebrated the so-called “pagan” virtues of beauty, strength, courage, magnanimity, and leadership. Another tradition—represented particularly by theologians—has celebrated exactly the opposite set of traits: the so-called “Christian” virtues of humility, meekness, quietude, asceticism, and obedience (Berlin, 1997). But what are the virtues? Where do they come from? Why do they consist of these two apparently incompatible sets of traits? And why have they been considered moral?
spellingShingle Curry, O
The conflict-resolution theory of virtue
title The conflict-resolution theory of virtue
title_full The conflict-resolution theory of virtue
title_fullStr The conflict-resolution theory of virtue
title_full_unstemmed The conflict-resolution theory of virtue
title_short The conflict-resolution theory of virtue
title_sort conflict resolution theory of virtue
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