The evolution of manipulative cheating

A social cheat is typically assumed to be an individual that does not perform a cooperative behaviour, or performs less of it, but can still exploit the cooperative behaviour of others. However, empirical data suggests that cheating can be more subtle, involving evolutionary arms races over the abil...

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Bibliografiset tiedot
Päätekijät: Liu, M, West, SA, Wild, G
Aineistotyyppi: Journal article
Kieli:English
Julkaistu: eLife Sciences Publications 2022
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author Liu, M
West, SA
Wild, G
author_facet Liu, M
West, SA
Wild, G
author_sort Liu, M
collection OXFORD
description A social cheat is typically assumed to be an individual that does not perform a cooperative behaviour, or performs less of it, but can still exploit the cooperative behaviour of others. However, empirical data suggests that cheating can be more subtle, involving evolutionary arms races over the ability to both exploit and resist exploitation. These complications have not been captured by evolutionary theory, which lags behind empirical studies in this area. We bridge this gap with a mixture of game-theoretical models and individual-based simulations, examining what conditions favour more elaborate patterns of cheating. We found that as well as adjusting their own behaviour, individuals can be selected to manipulate the behaviour of others, which we term ‘manipulative cheating’. Further, we found that manipulative cheating can lead to dynamic oscillations (arms races), between selfishness, manipulation, and suppression of manipulation. Our results can help explain both variation in the level of cheating, and genetic variation in the extent to which individuals can be exploited by cheats.
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spelling oxford-uuid:68632e70-9a29-4cfb-bfa3-6dd30beb0b4c2023-02-06T15:12:02ZThe evolution of manipulative cheatingJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:68632e70-9a29-4cfb-bfa3-6dd30beb0b4cEnglishSymplectic ElementseLife Sciences Publications2022Liu, MWest, SAWild, GA social cheat is typically assumed to be an individual that does not perform a cooperative behaviour, or performs less of it, but can still exploit the cooperative behaviour of others. However, empirical data suggests that cheating can be more subtle, involving evolutionary arms races over the ability to both exploit and resist exploitation. These complications have not been captured by evolutionary theory, which lags behind empirical studies in this area. We bridge this gap with a mixture of game-theoretical models and individual-based simulations, examining what conditions favour more elaborate patterns of cheating. We found that as well as adjusting their own behaviour, individuals can be selected to manipulate the behaviour of others, which we term ‘manipulative cheating’. Further, we found that manipulative cheating can lead to dynamic oscillations (arms races), between selfishness, manipulation, and suppression of manipulation. Our results can help explain both variation in the level of cheating, and genetic variation in the extent to which individuals can be exploited by cheats.
spellingShingle Liu, M
West, SA
Wild, G
The evolution of manipulative cheating
title The evolution of manipulative cheating
title_full The evolution of manipulative cheating
title_fullStr The evolution of manipulative cheating
title_full_unstemmed The evolution of manipulative cheating
title_short The evolution of manipulative cheating
title_sort evolution of manipulative cheating
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