“Fantasy upon fantasy”: Some reflections on Dworkin’s philosophy of international law
This article offers a critique of Ronald Dworkin’s article “A New Philosophy for International Law”, (Philos Public Aff 41: 1–30, 2013). It begins by showing that Dworkin’s moralised theory of law is built on two highly questionable background assumptions. On the one hand, a descriptively implausibl...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer
2021
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| _version_ | 1797110412858097664 |
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| author | Tasioulas, J |
| author_facet | Tasioulas, J |
| author_sort | Tasioulas, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This article offers a critique of Ronald Dworkin’s article “A New Philosophy for International Law”, (Philos Public Aff 41: 1–30, 2013). It begins by showing that Dworkin’s moralised theory of law is built on two highly questionable background assumptions. On the one hand, a descriptively implausible characterisation of a positivist-voluntarist view of international law as the reigning “orthodoxy”. On the other hand, the methodologically questionable assumption that a theory of international law must discharge the dual function of explaining the validity of international law in a manner that underwrites its presumptive legitimacy. In its core part, the article then offers a sustained criticism of Dworkin’s moralised account of the validity and legitimacy of international law. Various problems are identified with the “principle of salience” that Dworkin offers in place of consent as a ground for international law. A key concern is the difficulties that stem from Dworkin’s willingness to proceed on the “fantasy” assumption that his theory needs to get off the ground, i.e. that there is an international court with compulsory jurisdiction and reliable mechanisms for enforcing its judgements. Finally, the article concludes with some thoughts on how Dworkin’s “fantasy-based” approach led him to over-estimate the degree to which international law can be a vehicle for the global spread of liberal democratic values. More minimalist ambitions for international legal order, along the lines suggested by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples, seem more realistic. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:54:30Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:68bc5959-a228-4140-9076-a387b44df9c0 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:54:30Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:68bc5959-a228-4140-9076-a387b44df9c02023-08-10T11:49:28Z“Fantasy upon fantasy”: Some reflections on Dworkin’s philosophy of international lawJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:68bc5959-a228-4140-9076-a387b44df9c0EnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer2021Tasioulas, JThis article offers a critique of Ronald Dworkin’s article “A New Philosophy for International Law”, (Philos Public Aff 41: 1–30, 2013). It begins by showing that Dworkin’s moralised theory of law is built on two highly questionable background assumptions. On the one hand, a descriptively implausible characterisation of a positivist-voluntarist view of international law as the reigning “orthodoxy”. On the other hand, the methodologically questionable assumption that a theory of international law must discharge the dual function of explaining the validity of international law in a manner that underwrites its presumptive legitimacy. In its core part, the article then offers a sustained criticism of Dworkin’s moralised account of the validity and legitimacy of international law. Various problems are identified with the “principle of salience” that Dworkin offers in place of consent as a ground for international law. A key concern is the difficulties that stem from Dworkin’s willingness to proceed on the “fantasy” assumption that his theory needs to get off the ground, i.e. that there is an international court with compulsory jurisdiction and reliable mechanisms for enforcing its judgements. Finally, the article concludes with some thoughts on how Dworkin’s “fantasy-based” approach led him to over-estimate the degree to which international law can be a vehicle for the global spread of liberal democratic values. More minimalist ambitions for international legal order, along the lines suggested by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples, seem more realistic. |
| spellingShingle | Tasioulas, J “Fantasy upon fantasy”: Some reflections on Dworkin’s philosophy of international law |
| title | “Fantasy upon fantasy”: Some reflections on Dworkin’s philosophy of international law |
| title_full | “Fantasy upon fantasy”: Some reflections on Dworkin’s philosophy of international law |
| title_fullStr | “Fantasy upon fantasy”: Some reflections on Dworkin’s philosophy of international law |
| title_full_unstemmed | “Fantasy upon fantasy”: Some reflections on Dworkin’s philosophy of international law |
| title_short | “Fantasy upon fantasy”: Some reflections on Dworkin’s philosophy of international law |
| title_sort | fantasy upon fantasy some reflections on dworkin s philosophy of international law |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT tasioulasj fantasyuponfantasysomereflectionsondworkinsphilosophyofinternationallaw |